Where Pashinyan Is Right, and Where He May Be Mistaken About Georgia

2026-03-16 - 12:24

[Beyond Borders] This column explores the key issues shaping life in the South Caucasus, focusing on how the divergent paths of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan reflect the region’s complex histories, economic developments, and political shifts. While new generations in these countries grow more isolated from one another due to language barriers and conflicting national trajectories, the same is true for local policymakers, who are often more familiar with distant capitals than their immediate neighbors. Each nation seeks its own path, sometimes in conflict with others, while international actors often treat the region as a whole, reluctant to craft policies specific to individual states. Drawing on personal experience with the region’s revolutions, conflicts and transformations, Olesya brings you Beyond Borders—a column exploring how decisions made in one corner of the South Caucasus impact all who live there. Listen to the AI generated audio article. Your browser does not support the audio element. Speaking to EU legislators, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan described the “frozen state” of political dialogue between Georgia and the European Union as the biggest obstacle to Armenia’s own rapprochement with the bloc. A year earlier, Armenia had adopted a law declaring its European choice, a step that Pashinyan said was closely linked to the moment when the EU granted Georgia candidate status. If dialogue between Tbilisi and Brussels does not resume, he warned, the consequences will reach beyond Georgia. Armenia, too, could lose a realistic path toward closer ties with Europe. In many ways Pashinyan’s argument makes sense. Geography has long shaped the European Union’s approach to enlargement. For decades new members have tended to join in regional clusters, following their neighbors into the bloc. Even Georgia itself had to spend years persuading European officials that its maritime border with Europe across the Black Sea should count just as much as a land border. Only gradually did Brussels accept that Georgia could be considered a European country. Without a credible European perspective for Georgia, Armenia may find it much harder, or even impossible, to convince the EU that it belongs on a similar path. Yet Pashinyan’s reasoning also raises several questions. The issue is not only the timeline. Armenia’s parliament adopted its law on European integration more than a year after Georgia received candidate status in December 2023. By that time the Georgian government had already announced it was suspending political dialogue with Brussels—a decision that triggered the largest street protests in over a decade and a severe government crackdown in autumn 2024. The deeper difficulty lies elsewhere. While Pashinyan calls for dialogue, he offers little indication of what such a process might actually look like. Few people in Georgia or abroad would oppose the idea of resolving the country’s prolonged political crisis. Most observers agree that negotiations are necessary. The challenge is that the crisis has dragged on for so long and become so complicated that general appeals are unlikely to produce a sustainable outcome. By repeating this call in the European Parliament, one of the EU institutions most critical of the Georgian authorities, Pashinyan leaves open the question of how his remarks will be interpreted and whether they contribute to resolving the impasse. Who Opposes Dialogue? Since February, officials in Washington have begun discussing the possibility of resetting relations with Georgia. Representatives of the Georgian government have traveled to the United States to restore cooperation and move past earlier disagreements. For decades Georgia and the U.S. have worked closely on security issues. Georgian envoys have also appealed to political MAGA circles around Donald Trump, emphasizing Georgia’s identity as a Christian country and suggesting shared conservative values. More recently, Georgian officials have highlighted their willingness to participate in American initiatives related to the Armenian-Azerbaijani track. Georgia already allows Azerbaijani cargo to move along its railways toward Armenia and could continue to support regional reconciliation through transport links and cooperation. By presenting these arguments in Washington, Georgia hopes for a near-complete reset: disputed elections fade from the agenda, relations with the U.S. return to normal, and European critics eventually accept the new reality. Whether this strategy will succeed remains uncertain. Washington’s focus has been absorbed by the prolonged military campaign involving Iran, drawing resources away from other diplomatic efforts. Even negotiations over the war in Ukraine have struggled. In this environment Georgia’s political crisis is unlikely to be an immediate priority. The European Union has repeatedly tried to reopen dialogue with the Georgian authorities, both publicly and behind closed doors. Brussels has used official channels and informal intermediaries, offering several possible formats for renewed talks. Part of the motivation lies in a sense of responsibility. The consequences of the Georgian crisis have been painful. Dozens of protesters and opposition figures remain imprisoned. Many have fled the country. Thousands more face restrictions on their professional activities. At the same time European officials increasingly worry that a deepening confrontation inside Georgia could push the country closer to Russia. That shift would create longer-term risks not only for Georgia but for the wider region. Yet the Georgian government has repeatedly declined to engage with Brussels. Hungary, a close political partner of Tbilisi’s leadership, has blocked stronger EU measures against Georgian authorities. Without Budapest’s support, the European Union has limited options. Even a largely symbolic step, such as suspending visa-free travel for officials with diplomatic passports, took months to approve. The situation could change after Hungary’s elections next month, if the political balance there shifts. Until then, the Georgian leadership appears to see little reason to reopen a real dialogue with Europe. Armenia’s Interest Few doubt Armenia’s interest in stabilizing the situation in Georgia. Armenia is a small, landlocked country just emerging from decades of conflict with two of its neighbors. Nearly all its major transport routes pass through Georgian territory, linking Armenia to both Russia and Western markets. Instability in Georgia would create immediate difficulties for Armenia’s economy and foreign policy. Tbilisi for its part has little reason to accuse Yerevan of hostility. From the early days of the current political crisis Armenian officials hosted visits by representatives of the Georgian Dream leadership and met them at the highest level. They did so despite calls from some international actors not to engage with the Georgian authorities because of the disputed election results. Behind the scenes Armenian diplomats also encouraged Western partners not to dismiss the arguments put forward by Georgian officials and to explore ways to reopen dialogue. In this sense, Armenia’s position is consistent with its earlier approach. In 2023, Armenian representatives actively lobbied European capitals to grant Georgia EU candidate status, arguing that such a step would also create opportunities for Armenia’s own rapprochement with Europe. The difficulty today is that Armenia’s current appeals may easily be misunderstood. The Georgian crisis has lasted long enough and accumulated enough grievances that it cannot be resolved through symbolic gestures alone. Inviting Georgian leaders for official visits or restoring diplomatic courtesies will not address the deeper tensions within Georgian society. Even if relations with the Georgian authorities were suddenly reset and international criticism faded, the country would still face serious internal divisions. Political tensions would continue to shape domestic life, leaving space for Russian influence to grow. A lasting solution requires genuine dialogue between the Georgian government and the opposition. Such talks must go beyond questions about imprisoned political figures or restrictive laws. They would also need to address Georgia’s broader political future, including the possibility of genuine prospects for peaceful changes in power. Without this element, any dialogue risks becoming purely symbolic. External actors could still play a constructive role in guaranteeing such a process. The United States is the most obvious candidate, particularly since it has already imposed sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream party. The United Kingdom may also emerge as an important player; London recently sanctioned several media outlets linked to the ruling party, reportedly causing serious concern within the Georgian leadership. Pashinyan himself enjoys a largely positive reputation in Georgia. Among the country’s pro-Western opposition he is often seen as a symbol of resistance to the political model associated with Russia. His popularity sometimes takes unusual forms: Georgian shops have even used his image in advertisements to attract customers. The ruling party, despite including some outspoken nationalists, may also appreciate Pashinyan’s position. In Western capitals, he has occasionally appeared as one of the few leaders willing to argue publicly for engagement rather than isolation. Still goodwill alone is unlikely to resolve Georgia’s political crisis. If the Armenian prime minister presented more concrete proposals, his standing in Georgian society could give them greater weight, making them harder for the parties involved to ignore. Armenia’s interest in a stable, internationally connected Georgia is unlikely to raise doubts abroad. The question is whether that interest can eventually translate into a more active role in encouraging the dialogue that Georgia itself still needs. About the author Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst with over 15 years of experience in the South Caucasus, specializing in security, peace processes, and foreign policy. She has collaborated with leading international organizations, including the International Crisis Group, OSCE, and Freedom House, where she led research on conflict zones like Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia, while contributing to public policy and confidential peace processes. Previously, she worked as a journalist, reporting on security and conflict issues, including groundbreaking coverage for The New York Times during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Olesya has received numerous accolades, including the International Young Women’s Peace Award and the EU’s Peace Journalism Prize. She holds master’s degrees from King’s College London and the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs. See all [Beyond Borders] articles here Comment