What a Ceasefire in Ukraine Could Mean for the South Caucasus

2026-01-25 - 21:06

[Beyond Borders] This column explores the key issues shaping life in the South Caucasus, focusing on how the divergent paths of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan reflect the region’s complex histories, economic developments, and political shifts. While new generations in these countries grow more isolated from one another due to language barriers and conflicting national trajectories, the same is true for local policymakers, who are often more familiar with distant capitals than their immediate neighbors. Each nation seeks its own path, sometimes in conflict with others, while international actors often treat the region as a whole, reluctant to craft policies specific to individual states. Drawing on personal experience with the region’s revolutions, conflicts and transformations, Olesya brings you Beyond Borders—a column exploring how decisions made in one corner of the South Caucasus impact all who live there. Listen to the AI generated audio article. Your browser does not support the audio element. For negotiators in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict the moment is still far from allowing any pause for winter holidays. New rounds of talks are taking place almost daily as efforts continue to assemble a meaningful set of agreements that could halt the fighting and prevent its resumption, at least in the near term. Judging by the evolution of the discussions, these attempts appear to be more than purely tactical. Ukraine seems ready, at least for now, to declare a suspension of its earlier demand regarding NATO membership. Russia, for its part, is signaling a willingness to discuss security arrangements to sustain a ceasefire. Together these signals suggest that a serious desire to freeze hostilities may finally be emerging on both sides. Such a situation has not existed for at least the past three years, which in itself is a positive development. Still it would be naive to speak of an end to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. There has been no visible shift on the central issue of disagreement, namely the territorial dispute over Ukrainian regions claimed by Russia. Since 2022, the war has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, destroyed dozens of cities and hundreds of villages and forced millions into displacement. It is a conflict likely to smolder for years, perhaps decades, carrying a constant risk of renewed violence. Even so, if current efforts succeed and military action is halted, this would be a serious achievement. It would not only affect the parties directly involved, but could also reshape dynamics for their neighbors, including those in the South Caucasus. Opportunities to Resolve Georgia’s Crisis Georgia may be the country in the region most immediately affected by a ceasefire in Ukraine. For more than a year, it has been mired in a political crisis that has destabilized not only its domestic situation but also its relations with foreign partners. This crisis has reached a point where, if left unresolved, it will begin to create tangible problems both for the ruling authorities and for ordinary citizens. Georgia’s leadership has long pointed to the end of the war in Ukraine as a potential turning point. Their expectation is that reduced international tensions would prompt Western capitals to stop seeing the shadow of the Kremlin in the corridors of Georgian power and to normalize relations without serious preconditions. The flaw in this reasoning is that it underestimates the depth and intensity of Georgia’s conflict with its Western partners. European criticism is not limited to controversial legislation or mass arrests—developments that could in theory be reversed relatively quickly. In European capitals, officials often recall how much effort and expectation were invested in Georgia, particularly when it was granted EU candidate status in 2023. Instead of working toward compromise, Tbilisi sharply changed course and adopted rhetoric that echoed Russian propaganda narratives. The core issue in Georgia’s relations with Europe is a breakdown of trust, something that cannot be repaired quickly or without sustained and meaningful change. Georgia’s leadership also hoped to bypass Europe by striking a deal with the administration of Donald Trump. Envoys were sent to Washington, and Georgian officials went so far in public displays of loyalty that they commented more on U.S. domestic politics than on developments at home. This approach failed. Washington chose not to immerse itself in a crisis that offered neither simple solutions nor clear benefits. As one former diplomat put it, for the United States today, Georgia resembles an awkward burden, a suitcase with no handle: difficult to carry, but not yet ready to abandon. As a result Georgia now faces real risks. The European Union has signaled that it may gradually deepen the confrontation. This autumn the European Parliament adopted new regulations that would allow for the temporary, and later possibly longer-term, suspension of visa-free travel for Georgian passport holders. If implemented by the European Commission, this step would directly affect thousands of Georgian citizens who rely on seasonal work in Europe. It could also be followed by a suspension of duty-free trade, which has made Georgia attractive to investors seeking access to the European market. There is still a chance to halt this process. A freeze in the war in Ukraine could give new momentum to addressing Georgia’s crisis by freeing up time and political attention in Western capitals. But for this to happen, Georgia’s authorities must recognize the need for genuine concessions. These cannot be limited to cosmetic steps such as repealing repressive laws or releasing detainees. The government must demonstrate that it can once again be regarded as a credible partner. The Regional Impact of Georgia’s Crisis An isolated Georgia is a problem not only for its government and society, but for the entire South Caucasus. For Western capitals, the countries of the region are too small to justify building cooperation with only one or two of them. Meaningful progress in economic and political cooperation requires a shared regional vision, something that is impossible if Georgia remains on the margins. In this context the Washington accords between Armenia and Azerbaijan offer grounds for cautious optimism. The two sides committed to maintaining stability along the front lines and expressed an intention to establish transit connections. If Turkey were to join this process by opening its border, it would not only end Armenia’s isolation but also significantly expand regional transit potential. Yet when Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders shook hands at the White House on August 8, the moment was watched in Tbilisi with bitterness. Georgia was not represented, and for some officials this development raises concerns about potential losses in transit revenue. These concerns may only intensify if agreements on Ukraine lead Western companies to return to the Russian market. In that case the South Caucasus, and Georgia in particular, could begin losing the opportunity to profit from organizing transit to Russia, a major source of income since the start of the invasion of Ukraine. Armenia’s recent history shows that isolating a small South Caucasian state increases its dependence on an authoritarian neighbor such as Russia. Georgia still has formal disagreements with Moscow, but without Western support its position is weak. Maintaining a balanced distance in relations with Russia may not be sustainable for long. For now Western support for Georgia’s territorial integrity remains unchanged, but this too could erode over time if the rift with the West continues to deepen. Greater Georgian dependence on Russia would be bad news for the rest of the region, whether for Azerbaijan with its resources and ambitions, or for Armenia as it seeks greater autonomy and closer ties with the West. A ceasefire in Ukraine could open a window for resolving Georgia’s crisis. Tbilisi should seize this opportunity by engaging seriously in the process. Armenia and Azerbaijan could also consider supporting Georgia, if not for Georgia’s sake alone, then to preserve broader opportunities for their own future. About the author Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst with over 15 years of experience in the South Caucasus, specializing in security, peace processes, and foreign policy. She has collaborated with leading international organizations, including the International Crisis Group, OSCE, and Freedom House, where she led research on conflict zones like Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia, while contributing to public policy and confidential peace processes. Previously, she worked as a journalist, reporting on security and conflict issues, including groundbreaking coverage for The New York Times during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Olesya has received numerous accolades, including the International Young Women’s Peace Award and the EU’s Peace Journalism Prize. She holds master’s degrees from King’s College London and the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs. See all [Beyond Borders] articles here Comment