Watching TRIPP: China and the art of strategic patience

2026-02-10 - 17:36

Introduction China’s position on the TRIPP (Trump’s Route for International Peace and Prosperity) has been cautious and low-profile, shaped less by enthusiasm for the project itself than by Beijing’s overall policy toward the South Caucasus and the region’s geopolitical rivalries. From China’s perspective, TRIPP is not mutually exclusive with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From the U.S. perspective, however, the project carries geopolitical weight, aimed at containing or counterbalancing Russian, Iranian and Chinese influence in Eurasia. China has evaluated TRIPP primarily through the lens of risk management, given that the route traverses border regions historically vulnerable to conflict and border tensions, and lies at the intersection of regional rivalries. This helps explain why Beijing has avoided any public endorsement, opting instead for rhetorical neutrality and a wait-and-see approach — signaling that economic connectivity must be inclusive, territorial integrity respected, trade depoliticized and cooperation insulated from zero-sum geopolitical competition. More broadly, China’s policy in the South Caucasus has been characterized by strategic minimalism and economic pragmatism. Beijing has invested in Georgian and Azerbaijani trade routes, ports and key infrastructure projects without entangling itself in political disputes or geopolitical rivalries. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions, the northern Eurasian corridor via Russia became largely non-operational, leaving the South Caucasus as China’s only viable overland connection to Europe. This factor forced Beijing to prioritize the ‘Middle Corridor’ — also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) — strengthening ties with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey as key gateways to Europe. At the same time, China continues to defer to Russia’s traditional security role in the region by avoiding alignment and positioning itself as an economic partner rather than a political arbiter. This posture allows Beijing to institutionalize bilateral ties through BRI-led initiatives or frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization without providing any security commitments. In this view, China’s cautious stance on TRIPP reflects a larger strategic calculation: Beijing favors corridor diversification and interconnectivity over ‘corridor wars.’ Hence, rather than backing a single route, China seeks a pragmatic position on east-west and north-south connectivity routes, aiming to minimize sanction risks and avoid being drawn into neighboring territorial conflicts. Hence, any future Chinese engagement with TRIPP will be determined by the commercial, apolitical nature of the route and its positive impact on regional stability. China’s TRIPP dilemma China, rather than loudly opposing TRIPP, has quietly doubled down on its own regional projects while expanding strategic partnerships with the South Caucasus states. This is largely because TRIPP is not yet perceived by China as a geopolitical threat. Instead, it functions as a ‘double-edged sword.’ On one hand, Chinese companies could benefit from the infrastructure boost in the region to help connect themselves with the West. For China, being able to move containers from Chongqing to Rotterdam without worrying about maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal would be crucial for Chinese companies looking for cheaper trade routes. On the other hand, these potential gains come with strings attached. The TRIPP Implementation Framework gives the U.S. a 74% ownership stake, with Armenia holding the remaining 26%. For Chinese firms, such an imbalance might raise doubts. With the U.S. having that much influence over the project, it will certainly be difficult for Chinese companies to use TRIPP simply as a bridge toward Europe. Chinese companies may also have concerns that, in the case of future tension with the U.S., Washington could weaponize the route and potentially restrict access for Chinese cargo trucks or goods. China has spent the last two decades building the BRI specifically to avoid situations where Western powers can control regional infrastructure. By mid-2023, Beijing had signed over 200 cooperation agreements with more than 150 countries, with cumulative trade hitting $19.1 trillion. TRIPP threatens this massive trade by offering an alternative route that bypasses Chinese-influenced infrastructure entirely. What makes this frustrating for Beijing is that Armenia itself has been largely left out of the BRI framework. Despite the fact that Armenia signed a Memorandum on Promotion of Cooperation in Building the Silk Road Economic Belt back in 2015, none of the major BRI routes actually run through Armenian territory. Additionally, China’s infrastructure investments in Armenia have been minimal compared to those in Azerbaijan and Georgia. This means that if TRIPP succeeds the way Washington intends, it will be American, rather than Chinese, infrastructure that forms Armenia’s emergence as a transit hub. If Beijing fails to either find alternative routes or utilize TRIPP’s infrastructure, leaving Armenia out might end up being a missed opportunity for China. When Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Declaration, U.S. Senator Steve Daines said that the two countries were on the verge of cooperating to open up “critical supplies of oil, natural gas and critical minerals from Central Asia — those five countries — through this corridor, and then heading more towards Europe and the West instead of to Russia and China.” For Beijing, this confirms that the work Washington is doing in the South Caucasus is also about pulling states closer under U.S. influence. While Russia and Iran have been vocal in their opposition to TRIPP (though Moscow officially has been more cautious), China has not publicly commented on TRIPP whatsoever. This is because China has learned that going toe-to-toe with the U.S. over every infrastructure project is counterproductive. Instead of public confrontation, Beijing prefers working through diplomatic channels and economic incentives as the main strategy it has adopted to strengthen its influence internationally. Secondly, Armenia embracing TRIPP means that if China wants to continue to maintain good relations with Yerevan, opposing Armenia’s partnership with Washington might push Yerevan further away from China. Hence, why engage in a lose-lose situation? For that reason, China and Armenia established a strategic partnership during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin right after TRIPP was announced. Through this partnership, Beijing signaled its “firm support for the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the Republic of Armenia,” while also backing Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, which is the framework within Armenia that would eventually lead to TRIPP. This move by China was crucial because, instead of opposing TRIPP, China positioned itself to benefit from and contribute to Armenia’s connectivity transformation regardless of the American dominance over the initiative. In the joint statement, both sides mentioned that Yerevan “stands ready to work with China to actively promote the implementation of relevant cooperation projects under the BRI and the ‘Crossroads of Peace’ initiative.” This suggests that TRIPP does not necessarily have to exclude China; on the contrary, it may leave a lot of room for Chinese inclusion. It also helps explain Beijing’s relative silence on the initiative, which can be attributed in part to Yerevan’s openness to cooperation with China amid their growing positive diplomatic relations. Moreover, China rarely ever handles projects like this with confrontation, instead choosing to maneuver quietly behind the scenes to secure its own interests. Rather than trying to block TRIPP or pressuring Armenia to include them in the project, Beijing has been busy building and deepening its own alternatives. These projects operate on multiple levels and include bilateral deals with Armenia, major investments in the Middle Corridor and broader institutional frameworks that keep China firmly planted in the South Caucasus. The Belt and Road Initiative in the South Caucasus The BRI remains China’s main tool for facilitating the flow of goods across Eurasia, and the South Caucasus has become increasingly important to this project. While Armenia has not been a priority for Chinese investment compared to its neighbors, countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia play a central role in the East-West connectivity within this initiative. Azerbaijan has been successful in attracting Chinese investments, with bilateral trade continuing to increase. This includes Chinese investments in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which provides a direct link to Turkey and Europe, along with renewable energy projects that diversify Azerbaijan’s economy beyond hydrocarbons. Unfortunately for Armenia, this railway was designed in a way to bypass its closed Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi railway, instead linking Azerbaijan directly to Georgia and Turkey. However, Armenia’s willingness to establish relations with Azerbaijan and negotiations with Turkey may help open up this railway, which has been closed since 1993 due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. If realized, linking the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi route to TRIPP may open new connectivity alternatives for China. Georgia, meanwhile, holds strategic value as the Black Sea outlet for the Middle Corridor. It was actually the first South Caucasus state to sign a Silk Road memorandum with Beijing back in 2015, ahead of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. China’s investment in Georgia includes significant infrastructure projects and a strategic partnership agreement signed in 2023 that set the stage for similar deals with Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 2024, a Chinese-Singaporean consortium was selected to develop the Georgian Anaklia deep-sea port, a key to the Middle Corridor trade route, thus jeopardizing U.S. interests in the Black Sea region. The Middle Corridor as a Chinese alternative route Another alternative project to TRIPP for China is the Middle Corridor. This infrastructure network connects China to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, bypassing both Russia and Iran. This route has gained significance amid Russia’s war in Ukraine and ongoing Iranian-Israeli tensions, including broader regional proxy conflict. The corridor comprises more than 4,250 kilometers of rail lines and 500 kilometers of seaway, with the potential to reduce transit time between China and Europe to just 12 days. Moreover, China’s involvement in the Middle Corridor has increased significantly since 2022, when the Russia-Ukraine conflict disrupted northern routes. In August 2025, the China Railway Container Transport Corp. (CRCT) formally joined the Middle Corridor Multimodal Ltd., a joint railway venture established in 2023 that includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia. This move, which came shortly before the Washington Summit in October 2025, signaled China’s intention to secure efficient Eurasian trade routes that complement BRI’s geo-economic objectives. Unlike TRIPP, where the U.S. holds majority ownership and control, the Middle Corridor is governed by a multilateral framework in which China participates as an equal partner alongside Central Asian and South Caucasian states. This makes the states involved feel less intimidated by a great power. Additionally, the Middle Corridor reduces dependency on any single route or bilateral relationship, meaning that foreign policy changes won’t affect the entirety of the project. Finally, through this route, cargo volumes have grown from 350,000 tons in 2020 to 3.2 million tons in 2022, with further increases of 89% in 2023 and 70% in 2024. These developments show that China views the Middle Corridor not merely as a supplement to existing routes, but as a primary alternative capable of handling cargo flows while remaining independent of American control. Conclusion China’s perspective on TRIPP is shaped by its broader goals in a world where U.S. hegemony can now be actively challenged. Beijing neither rejects TRIPP outright nor fully embraces it. Instead, it has adopted a cautious posture, carefully balancing restraint with the pursuit of its own interests in regional connectivity and trade. By maintaining a ‘strategic patience’ in the South Caucasus, China is effectively safeguarding its geo-economic interests while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. This approach decouples trade and connectivity from regional conflicts, allowing Beijing to expand its economic engagement and logistic networks across Central Asia and the South Caucasus without becoming entangled in the domestic or foreign policy disputes of regional actors. At the same time, this strategy mitigates the risk of any single power from dominating Eurasian trade routes, reinforcing China’s image as a pragmatic and attractive partner. This posture gives Beijing enough flexibility and influence in shaping the evolution of emerging connectivity corridors, while in parallel supporting regional economic development and advancing its geo-economic interests. Looking ahead, the future of TRIPP — and China’s role within or alongside it — will be influenced by geopolitical developments, including the evolution of U.S.-China relations; the diplomatic ‘normalization’ between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan; and the enrollment or exclusion of Iran and Russia in these regional economic projects. The risk of the region turning into an American-Chinese economic confrontation zone is always there. China’s economic enrollment in the region makes it clear that Beijing does not intend to abandon its economic influence; rather, it is expanding its investments and partnerships to ensure it remains a key player in determining how Eurasian trade routes develop in the coming years. Finally, as regional conflicts in the Middle East intensify, China may be forced to adopt a more assertive role to secure its BRI projects and trade routes amid increased U.S. influence across Eurasia.