The South Caucasus in an America-First World

2026-01-25 - 21:06

[Beyond Borders] This column explores the key issues shaping life in the South Caucasus, focusing on how the divergent paths of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan reflect the region’s complex histories, economic developments, and political shifts. While new generations in these countries grow more isolated from one another due to language barriers and conflicting national trajectories, the same is true for local policymakers, who are often more familiar with distant capitals than their immediate neighbors. Each nation seeks its own path, sometimes in conflict with others, while international actors often treat the region as a whole, reluctant to craft policies specific to individual states. Drawing on personal experience with the region’s revolutions, conflicts and transformations, Olesya brings you Beyond Borders—a column exploring how decisions made in one corner of the South Caucasus impact all who live there. Listen to the AI generated audio article. Your browser does not support the audio element. From the start of the year, American politics has felt like a meme come to life: an exhausted sailor sighs, “What a week, huh?” only to be told, “Captain, it’s Wednesday!” After Venezuela, the focus shifted to Greenland, while debates over Ukraine continued against the backdrop of a deepening crisis around Iran. Living by headlines has become routine in the United States. A year into Trump’s second term, the sheer number of consequential domestic and foreign developments is hard to track. Even seasoned observers of American politics now half-jokingly suggest turning to fortune-tellers, who seem to have better odds of predicting what comes next. When it comes to priorities in the South Caucasus, the picture remains imprecise but has become clearer over time. The region is not a priority for the current administration. One telling sign is that, following the most recent departure of the U.S. ambassador from Armenia, all countries of the South Caucasus were left without senior American diplomatic representation for the first time on record. Washington did place an important final note in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, but the absence of any broader regional vision is evident in the fact that Georgia’s political crisis remains unresolved. Domestic Priorities First The South Caucasus is hardly the only region relegated to the margins of U.S. attention. International relations theory often holds that foreign policy flows from domestic conditions. Even proponents of this view may not have anticipated just how literally it would apply to the United States today. For the dominant political forces, non-intervention abroad has become the central domestic priority. The United States has long been among the most inward-looking Western countries, but the current retreat from international engagement is unusually explicit. Even limited discussions of short-term foreign operations now provoke loud criticism, primarily from Trump’s MAGA supporters. The recent decision to withdraw from dozens of international institutions, with potentially destabilizing consequences, draws objections from only a handful of former U.S. officials, whose voices barely register in today’s media environment. I lived in the United States 18 years ago, and it felt like a different country from the one I have been in for the past several months. Almost every day brings a small but disorienting discovery. A woman I met while discussing a possible rental described how afraid she was to drive near Capitol Hill in the days before and after last summer’s military parade. On my way to a party in central Washington, I encountered tall men carrying rifles. They were National Guardsmen, smiling when they noticed my startled expression. As time goes on internal divisions become more visible. Some people I know now spend evenings and weekends attending training sessions on how to film and document potential human rights violations, in case they witness what they believe could be unlawful detention of migrants in the DC streets. When I first saw a student bring a gun into a classroom, I was shocked. Days later, I was asked to attend a training on how to respond if a mass shooting occurred on my university campus. Occasionally, conversations turn to the risk of civil unrest, with comparisons to countries Americans once discussed only in foreign policy seminars. “This is not the U.S. I knew,” a veteran Caucasus diplomat, who has spent his career working on American affairs, told me during my first weeks here. These divisions will continue to absorb the administration’s attention, especially as it prepares for midterm elections later this year. If Democrats replicate successes like that of Zohran Mamdani, who won the mayoralty of New York, a city Trump still considers his hometown, the current administration could become a lame duck far earlier than its fourth year — typical in a presidential term. Strains With Europe Domestic instability does not rule out foreign adventures. In fact, many American observers expect the temptation for such moves to grow as internal resistance to Trump’s policies intensifies. Europe is likely to remain at the center of these tensions. I remember speaking with diplomats from one Western European country exactly a year ago, when they still anticipated manageable change, drawing on their experience with Trump’s first term. None of them imagined even a fraction of the disputes that would soon emerge between Washington and European capitals. Today, conversations with European embassy officials in Washington are often marked by weary sighs. Much of their agenda is consumed by adjusting to U.S. tariffs designed to redirect investment and production to American soil. Once that topic is exhausted, attention shifts to security guarantees, under which parts of Europe have lived since the mid-20th century. Before the United States and Europe could settle responsibility-sharing over Ukraine, Greenland suddenly moved to the center of the conversation, placing yet another burden on already overstretched European diplomatic services. This constant strain is beginning to affect areas of cooperation that once seemed immune. One such area is the South Caucasus, where Europe and the United States had long alternated roles effectively. Just a couple of years ago, when the EU faced deadlock in Armenian-Azerbaijani talks, U.S. officials stepped in to help revive the process. When Washington lacked ideas, European engagement often filled the gap. Today, coordination is far more difficult. Contacts between European and American officials on the Caucasus continue, but even when agreements are reached, they are shaped by the broader and increasingly adversarial relationship between Washington and Brussels. This dynamic could potentially affect European participation in the project to open transit routes through southern Armenia. Just days ago, Armenia’s Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State presented a framework document in Washington outlining how the route would function. From the moment the project surfaced last summer, many argued that EU involvement would be essential, given its financial resources and deeper regional policy engagements. But if U.S.-EU relations deteriorate further, even cooperation in the Caucasus could become collateral damage. One Western official compared the situation to Europe’s attempt to maintain dialogue with Russia on the Caucasus even after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. “No matter how hard we tried to compartmentalize, it didn’t work,” he said, though he added that U.S.-European relations might still fare better, given their denser and more institutionalized ties. The South Caucasus in the Background Against this backdrop, the region itself appears relatively stable. Even without ambassadors, Washington maintains trusted envoys on the ground whose influence sometimes exceeds that of traditional diplomats. Still, no matter how close these figures are to the administration, they cannot alter the region’s basic position: the South Caucasus remains secondary to larger U.S. priorities elsewhere. The Armenian-Azerbaijani Accords signed at the White House last August remain an exception rather than a model. Remarkably, even months later, they are one of the few foreign policy actions around which Washington finds consensus. Many see them as a timely and meaningful contribution personally associated with Trump, despite deep disagreements over almost every other aspect of his policies. That exception points to a broader lesson for those hoping for greater U.S. engagement in their region. Waiting for outside actors to resolve local problems rarely works. What matters instead is a clear articulation of interests and a realistic assessment of what is achievable. When that groundwork is done at home, even symbolic engagement from Washington, including from President Trump himself, becomes far more likely. In that sense, if European involvement remains needed in a U.S.-brokered project, it must be secured directly, rather than deferred in the hope that Washington and Brussels will soon settle their differences. About the author Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst with over 15 years of experience in the South Caucasus, specializing in security, peace processes, and foreign policy. She has collaborated with leading international organizations, including the International Crisis Group, OSCE, and Freedom House, where she led research on conflict zones like Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia, while contributing to public policy and confidential peace processes. Previously, she worked as a journalist, reporting on security and conflict issues, including groundbreaking coverage for The New York Times during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Olesya has received numerous accolades, including the International Young Women’s Peace Award and the EU’s Peace Journalism Prize. She holds master’s degrees from King’s College London and the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs. See all [Beyond Borders] articles here Comment