Filling the vacuum: Türkiye and the Balkan Peace Platform

2026-02-12 - 17:27

Scholars of international relations often compare the diplomatic structures of the Ottoman Empire and the modern Republic of Türkiye. However, a crucial difference between the two is frequently overlooked. Historically, the Ottoman Empire was viewed as an antagonistic power, both regionally and internationally. Throughout successive centuries, numerous European-led coalitions were organized to deter the threat of Turkish aggression and its brutal expansionist policies. Today, however, we observe a clear break from that past. This historical contrast should not be understood as a moral transformation of the Turkish state, but rather as an evolution in the instruments through which Ankara pursues influence within the international system. For example, the détente between the Soviet Union and Türkiye was primarily driven by Moscow’s changing perception of Ankara as a mediator and peaceful regional force, rather than an antagonist. Similarly, in the early phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ankara attempted to portray itself as a possible mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That effort ultimately failed due to historical grievances with Armenia and Ankara’s complete alignment with Azerbaijan. From a neo-realist perspective, we can also deduce that this policy adopted by Ankara, and then by Turkish President Turgut Özal, was aligned with the American vision, which considered the fall of the Soviet Union and the absence of a regional power in the Caucasus a major destabilizing factor. Türkiye stood as the only trustworthy actor for Washington that could fulfill this task. Hence, this continuity suggests that Turkish mediation behavior is less dependent on leadership personalities and more rooted in institutional diplomatic reflexes shaped by systemic constraints and opportunities. Diplomatic rhetoric yielding no concrete results in the Caucasus, the Middle East and elsewhere forced Ankara to modify its approach — at least to the extent necessary to demonstrate a credible mediating capacity. As such, this approach culminated in the establishment of the Balkan Peace Platform, through its inaugural meeting held on July 26, 2025. The meeting brought together leaders from six Balkan countries. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia were represented by their foreign ministers, while Albania participated at the deputy foreign minister level. The meeting was convened directly by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, giving Türkiye an immediate, albeit informal, leadership role. However, the willingness of Balkan states to participate should not be seen as passive acceptance of Turkish initiative, but rather as an active search for alternative diplomatic channels. Following the meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized that opportunities outweigh challenges in the region. He noted that all participating states, except from Kosovo, are candidates for European Union (EU) membership and could assist one another in their accession processes. By linking the platform to EU accession discourse, Ankara subtly positions itself as a facilitator of European aspirations without being a member of the Union, thereby inserting itself into a process from which it is formally excluded. To understand the strategic calculation behind this move by Ankara, we need to observe the Balkans through a neo-realist lens. Since 2017, beginning with the first term of U.S. President Donald Trump, Washington’s official diplomatic doctrine has increasingly been described as favoring disengagement where possible, with minimal strategic cost — a partial return to the isolationist tendencies of 19th- and early 20th-century U.S. foreign policy. This disengagement should not be understood as total withdrawal, but rather as a reprioritization that reduces diplomatic depth in regions perceived as relatively stable compared to other global hotspots. In the case of the Balkans, these claims are evidenced by the continued delay in confirming U.S. ambassadors to Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Macedonia, which have been relegated to the level of chargés d’affaires only. Moreover, the American perception of stability vis-à-vis the Balkans has led to the prioritization of other regions viewed as facing higher levels of instability. The disengagement of the United States from humanitarian projects and aid may also be a contributing factor. In diplomatic practice, prolonged ambassadorial vacancies and reductions in development engagement are often interpreted by regional actors as indicators of declining strategic attention, regardless of official rhetoric to the contrary. From the European perspective, the constantly postponed and slowed process plaguing accession to the European Union has naturally created domestic and diplomatic malaise in the Balkans, which is a driving force for these states to initiate rapprochement with Türkiye. This environment creates fertile ground for regional actors, such as Türkiye, to present themselves as an alternative to Brussels. Another crucial addition is the presence of Kosovo and Serbia within the same peace platform. Symbolically, this showcases the ability of Ankara to convene opposing actors. The inclusion of Serbia also signals two main developments. First, while Russian influence has not disappeared from the region, its relative reduction in visibility creates additional diplomatic space for alternative actors to assume more prominent roles. Also, the authorities in Belgrade appear to be prioritizing pragmatism in order to preserve state interests, regardless of the issue of territorial integrity vis-à-vis Kosovo, which may be irresolvable in both the short and long term. Consequently, amid American and European disengagement — or limited engagement — with the Balkans and Russia being preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, this vacuum allowed Ankara to step in and create this informal gathering, which also held its second meeting on Jan. 23, 2026. For Türkiye, these developments go beyond informality and casual diplomacy. The pro-government news platform Daily Sabah asserts that “...the Balkans Peace Platform and complementary cooperation mechanisms assume clear strategic relevance. Beyond their role in facilitating dialogue and confidence-building, these frameworks function as tools through which Türkiye can embed its interests within regional structures, enhance its leverage and manage the risks generated by competing external pressures.” Although this statement originates from a pro-government outlet, it reflects a broader narrative within Turkish strategic discourse that views mediation frameworks as instruments of geopolitical positioning rather than purely altruistic initiatives. In this sense, the Balkan Peace Platform functions less as a vehicle for conflict resolution and more as a mechanism through which Türkiye institutionalizes its relevance in a region experiencing external strategic neglect. What appears as mediation is better understood as an exercise in influence projection consistent with neo-realist expectations of state behavior in a multipolar system.