Compromise need not be a dirty word

2026-03-10 - 15:25

Certain terms in our Armenian geopolitical discourse, regardless of viewpoint, elicit emotional responses. In our current landscape, compromise is one of those labels. It is most commonly associated with international dialogue or negotiations, such as the peace talks with Azerbaijan and “normalization” discussions with Turkey. Of course, there are a variety of opinions, but a great deal of the opinions — particularly from the diaspora — are negative. Compromise is an offer or agreement between at least two parties, based on mutual concessions. The process is very dependent on the balance of those concessions, which affects its sustainability. A one-sided agreement may satisfy third parties, but it rarely delivers lasting peace. Much of the dialogue concerning the “compromises” with Azerbaijan and Turkey relates to the importance and impact of the concessions. Neither side wants to concede anything, but the absence of compromise only creates further risk. When we factor in leverage (or lack thereof) and security threats, some of the concessions may be viewed in a different light. Most of our recent experiences with compromises have been in the foreign policy domain with external parties. When we consider compromise for internal disputes, we not only have fewer examples in our Armenian experience, but compromise takes on even greater potential. Unfortunately, compromising has not been a hallmark of our internal challenges. We seem to prefer fueling escalation with significant collateral damage, in the absence of solutions. In a perfect world, we should hope to minimize internal disputes within the homeland and diaspora in order to optimize resources for prosperity and security. All self-inflicted internal conflicts drain some amount of resources from our primary focus. Reviewing the current church-state crisis from this perspective may offer some clarity. The current approach by both parties has not changed. The government wants Catholicos Karekin II to resign and is advocating for “reform” in the succession process and institutional management. The church rejects this approach as an affront to its historical independence and is focused on consolidating loyalty. Escalation has been the tool of choice, and it should be obvious that neither party will receive a surrender or capitulation. This waiting game increases the chances of long-term damage, which is not in the interest of either party. With neither party blinking and only doubling down on their positions, an acceptable compromise appears to be the correct path. The advocacy from the church and state may articulate their justification but is doing little to convince the opposition. I have been encouraged by the sharing of potential compromises in the last two weeks. It is a refreshing change from the hardened pro or con positions that offer no specifics and therefore only serve as partisan endorsements. Nearly two weeks ago, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Sahak II, made what I considered to be a bold and responsible proposal when he suggested that the Supreme Spiritual Council be replaced, in the interim period, with an elected 12-bishop synod that would assist the Vehapar in the functioning of Holy Etchmiadzin. His premise that the conflict and dissension have rendered the SSC dysfunctional was honest and reasonable advice. This synod would invite members of the dissenting group of bishops for full representation. He further stated that this synod and the Vehapar should immediately schedule the National Ecclesiastical Assembly to resolve the defined issues. This past week, other bold and compromising suggestions were articulated. A few sources suggested that the National Ecclesiastical Assembly convene and elect a coadjutor Catholicos to serve with Karekin II. The coadjutor has had precedent twice in the last 100 years of the church. It is usually implemented when the sitting Catholicos is unable to fulfill his duties, primarily due to health reasons. In 1931, the venerable and aged Catholicos of Cilicia, Sahak II, asked for a coadjutor. Babken I served in that capacity until his passing in 1936. Ironically, Sahak II continued as Catholicos until his passing in 1939 at age 90. Catholicos Sahak’s primacy began in 1902 in Sis, Cilicia, and he courageously shepherded his flock during the genocide and secured the location in Antelias, Lebanon. Another coadjutor was elected by the Holy See of Cilicia in 1977, when then Karekin II was elected coadjutor to the sitting Catholicos Khoren I. He remained as coadjutor until Khoren’s passing in 1983, at which time he continued as the Catholicos of Cilicia until 1994. Short of an outright resignation by Karekin II or removal by the Ecclesiastical Assembly, the election of a coadjutor offers a compromise in a power-sharing arrangement. It would be an almost unprecedented move for the Holy See of Etchmiadzin, but bold moves and concessions will be needed to bridge the current gap. It is hoped that combining the two proposals (a new bishops’ synod comprised of some dissident bishops, convening the Ecclesiastical Assembly and electing a coadjutor) would send a message of reform to the state and offer tangible evidence that the church is reestablishing its self-discipline. The church would move off its denial position sufficient to signal that it is “reforming” while maintaining the dignity of independence. It would also offer a more graceful opportunity for Karekin II to retire without the perception of being forced out or the humiliation of being voted out. The state could take credit for encouraging action when the church needed assistance and could avoid the ugly optics of arresting the Catholicos on the sacred ground of Holy Etchmiadzin. This would also enable the pre-election campaign to focus on the critical issues of national security and the economy. The church-state conflict has always been a self-imposed distraction that has the potential to become an unpredictable wild card. Finally, it could reduce tension with the diaspora. Aside from relations with the church, the diaspora has always had an underdeveloped relationship with the homeland. While millions in financial support and thousands in human capital through NGOs and nonprofits have been a bedrock, the church conflict has left the diaspora feeling like an outsider with two institutions that it is emotionally invested in. Armenia dislikes the public criticism of its government policies and views some diaspora activity as overly independent of what Armenia considers foreign policy matters. As illustrated by the statement of the “eight leaders” of the diaspora, the diaspora is not an organized body but rather a decentralized grouping of organizations and prominent individuals. This can create misconceptions about intent. Regardless of our differences, we all must work for the best interests of the Armenian people. With such diverse views and unbridled opinions, it is essential that we calm the waters and offer compromises that will bring us closer to a solution. Both parties, in their attempt to support their objectives, are crossing dangerous precedents. The government must consider the long-term impact on one of the pillars of democracy — separation of church and state. For its part, the church cannot realistically expect to simply weather this storm. Regardless of how unconventional and disturbing the conflict has become, the issues of corruption and mismanagement have been a clear part of our “whisper” culture for decades. The time to ignore these problems has passed. If members of the clergy have broken the laws of Armenia, then due process must be ensured. The church must be held responsible for internal review beyond that point. If the church wants the state to de-escalate, then it must take responsibility by implementing compromises. Denial and consolidating loyalty must give way to transparency and reform. This may give the government pause and bring us closer to stability. We have been conditioned through our turbulent relations with Turks and Azeris to believe that compromise weakens our position. If we were working with a good-faith external adversary, then trust would be stronger and perhaps dilute the impact of concessions. Unfortunately, Aliyev is not a reliable negotiating partner. While we speak of compromises for peace, he speaks of “Western Azerbaijan” and returning Azeris to Armenia. Compromise will be a tainted term for Armenians until Azeris and Turks embrace respect and dignity rather than the superiority complex they remind us of. Nevertheless, for internal issues, compromise is not only essential but can also be unifying. What is the point of engaging in endless conflict as Armenians when that reduces our strength? Consider our opportunity as a Venn diagram. The overlapping area of the two circles (one representing the state and one the church) defines the opportunity for compromise. Within that area of commonality are positions and issues that we share as Armenians. Conflict narrows the overlap while compromise expands the possibilities. Today, we are focused in each party’s circle where there is no overlap and thus minimal opportunity for resolution. It would be productive for influential third parties to encourage ideas of reasonable compromise to expand the overlap rather than simply declaring loyalty to one side or the other. The latter approach builds walls that are not in anyone’s long-term interest, while the former opens possibilities. Compromising with a party with whom you share a common foundation can be as liberating as forgiveness.