Azerbaijan Continues to Arm Itself While Talking Peace

2026-03-19 - 09:31

Listen to the AI generated audio article. Your browser does not support the audio element. Armenia and Azerbaijan appear closer to peace than at any point in decades. They finalized a draft peace agreement in March 2025 and their foreign ministers initialed the text in Washington last August, alongside a joint declaration by Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev, witnessed by U.S. President Donald Trump, pledging to “maintain and strengthen peace”. During U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s recent visit to both capitals, Aliyev went further, declaring that the two countries had effectively “lived in peace” for six months. Yet, it did not take long for him to reiterate Baku’s demand that Armenia amend its Constitution to remove an alleged territorial claim as a precondition for signing a final treaty. Pashinyan, for his part, insists the conflict is over, adding that peace requires daily care and institutionalization. Notably, for the first time in over three decades, 2025 saw no fatalities from enemy fire along the border. Whether this moment translated into a durable peace remains an open question. The rhetoric suggests progress but trust remains low and the foundations of relative peace in an increasingly chaotic world are still shaky. In the meantime, Azerbaijan, with its hydrocarbon revenues, is showing no sign of slowing its armament procurement. Since the 2020 war and its takeover and ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), Baku has sustained high levels of military spending and turned to new suppliers, signaling a long-term commitment to robust rearmament even as it speaks the language of peace. War Spoils During and after the 2020 war and the 2023 offensive, Azerbaijani armed forces seized substantial quantities of military equipment from Armenian and Artsakh forces. In a March 2024 speech, Ilham Aliyev claimed that assets worth $5 billion in 2020 and $1 billion in 2023 were either captured or destroyed. These figures cannot be independently verified. During the 2020 war, Oryx, an open-source intelligence team, visually confirmed 152 Armenian tanks destroyed or damaged and 103 captured, while heavy artillery losses amounted to 245 destroyed or damaged and 118 captured. Following the takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry reported to have seized a large amount of equipment and ammunition from Armenian forces, including 235 grenade launchers, 60 howitzers and cannons, 58 anti-tank weapons, 31 armored vehicles, among other things. The fate of much of this captured equipment remains unclear. It may have been placed in storage, integrated into Azerbaijani service, repurposed for spare parts, or displayed as trophies. Traditional Suppliers During its rapid militarization phase in the 2010s, Baku relied primarily on Russia and Israel as its main arms providers, with Turkey and Belarus playing smaller but still strategically important roles. Turkey Azerbaijan’s closest defense partner continues to be Turkey. Although Turkish arms exports to Baku were historically more limited than those from Russia and Israel, Ankara played a decisive, if indirect, role in shaping Azerbaijan’s battlefield capabilities during the 2020 war. Arms sales and cooperation have since kept pace and further deepened. In February 2024, Aliyev inspected an Akıncı drone at an Azerbaijani air force facility, confirming Baku’s acquisition of these combat UAVs. Akıncı is a more capable, larger-class drone developed by the same manufacturer as the Bayraktar TB2 drones widely deployed in 2020. Both systems are produced by Baykar, led by Turkish President Erdogan’s son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar. The order was likely placed in 2022, as a group of Azerbaijani pilots completed Akıncı training in October of that year. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database indicates the purchase of two units. According to the reports provided by Turkey to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), Ankara has supplied 22 wheeled armored personnel carriers to Azerbaijan in 2022 and 2023. SIPRI identifies these as Cobra II. In 2022, Turkey additionally reported a transfer of 109 precision guidance kits to the UN Register, which SIPRI identifies as KGK-83 guided glide bombs. Produced by the state-run defense R&D institute (SAGE), these convert conventional free-fall bombs into guided glide munitions. As Hetq has noted, these can be employed by Azerbaijan’s Su-25 jets which have been upgraded in Turkey. The Su-25 modernization is carried out by another state-run company, the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI/TUSAS) according to an agreement signed in July 2023. Entitled Laçin, the program upgrades the aircrafts’ avionics while integrating modern Turkish air-to-ground munitions. Apart from guided bombs, the upgraded Su-25s can also launch SOM-B1 cruise missiles, whose delivery to Azerbaijan began in 2024. These cruise missiles can also be launched from the abovementioned Akıncı drones. The SOM missiles were first showcased at a 2018 parade in Baku, but were reportedly purchased formally in 2021. In 2024, Turkey supplied 256 grenade launchers according to its report to the UN. At the 2025 Baku parade, Azerbaijan showcased—for the first time—the Kayra unmanned surface vessel produced by Dearsan. Israel Another of Baku’s key allies, Israel, has likewise continued its supplies after 2020. The largest acquisition, a $1.2 billion contract for the advanced Barak MX air defense system, was reported in November 2023. Two months earlier Azerbaijan’s Air Force had conducted live-fire exercises of İldırım-8-ER, the local designation of Barak-8 ER (extended range). Barak-8 is the foundational platform on which Barak-MX is based. Baku had acquired one Barak-8 launcher along with 40 missiles in 2016, according to SIPRI. Most of Baku’s newly-acquired Israeli systems were displayed for the first time at the Baku parade in November 2025. Among these were the Hero-120 loitering munition, reportedly supplied a year earlier; the Orbiter-5 reconnaissance drone; and the Sea Breaker maritime and land-based long-range missile system. At the parade, Baku also unveiled two systems launched from PULS, a multiple launch rocket system that uses interchangeable pods allowing it to launch a variety of missiles. The first is vehicle-based launch system of the SkyStriker Block-4 loitering munitions, while the second a Predator Hawk missile system—both mounted on a PULS chassis. A 2024 report claimed Azerbaijan had acquired Sky Dew high-altitude aerostat for advanced missile and aircraft detection from Israel, but this has not been confirmed. Shephard Media quoted Israeli sources denying the report. Instead, it said Baku had asked for two Ofeq-type high-resolution spy satellites and SpyX loitering munitions. Haaretz had reported earlier that Azerbaijan has chosen Israel Aerospace Industries for the supply of two satellites for $120 million. Pakistan and China While Pakistan has long backed Baku diplomatically, defense cooperation, especially armament sales had remained modest until recently. In 2018, Azerbaijan procured ten MFI-17 trainer aircraft from Islamabad. Then in early 2024, Azerbaijani and Pakistani media reports claimed Azerbaijan had ordered JF-17C Thunder fighter jets for $1.6 billion. A now-deleted post from the Pakistan government in June 2025 revealed that Azerbaijan and Pakistan had “signed a $2 billion investment and $4.6 billion defense deal to purchase 40 Pakistani JF-17 aircraft.” At least some were supplied by September 2024, when President Aliyev inspected the jets at the Baku airport. Five of these aircraft flew over the Baku parade in November 2025. The JF-17 jets, co-developed by Pakistan and China, are a major addition to the Azerbaijani Air Force. Ahead of the November 2025 parade, two HQ-9 Chinese air defense systems were spotted in Baku. Up to that point, there had been no reports of procurement of the Chinese surface-to-air missile systems by Azerbaijan. This marked the first known major procurement of Chinese equipment by Baku. Serbia Besides Czechia and Slovakia, Azerbaijan has acquired a significant quantity of artillery systems from another Eastern European state. Serbia, unlike the first two, however, is neither in the EU nor NATO. In November 2023, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic had announced the signing of a major defense industry contract worth €311 million with a “friendly country”. He did not disclose further information, but Serbian media reports suggested that it involved the purchase of 48 howitzers, which Vucic implicitly confirmed. Later media reports pointed to Azerbaijan as the buyer. In a June 2024 interview, Vucic said that Belgrade had signed a contract with Baku worth over $400 million in defense sales. In October 2025, Serbian-produced Nora B-52 howitzers were used during a joint two-week tactical training of the artillery units of Azerbaijani and Serbian militaries. The Serbian Defense Ministry explicitly confirmed in a press release that the Azerbaijani armed forces “have Serbian self-propelled gun-howitzers in their arsenal.” NATO Countries Until recent years, NATO members, with the exception of Turkey, mostly adhered to the 1992 OSCE embargo on arms deliveries to Armenia and Azerbaijan. With the dissolution of Nagorno-Karabakh and the ongoing peace process, the embargo has been de facto lifted, opening the door for defense sales from the West. Italy Italy has long been a close trade partner of Baku, which supplies a significant portion of its oil imports. The first Italian defense sale was announced in February 2020 during Aliyev’s visit to Rome, when the two countries formalized a strategic partnership. Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov and Alessandro Profumo, CEO of defense manufacturer Leonardo, signed a declaration on the acquisition of an integration system for M-346 aircraft. It was a preliminary agreement paving the way for Baku to acquire the advanced jet trainer, which is also capable of attack roles. No deliveries were reported by October 2020 and Leonardo had no plans to supply them in 2021. The jets have not been seen in Azerbaijan and the plans may have been shelved. In June 2023, Azerbaijan and Italy signed an agreement for the supply of the C-27J Spartan aircraft from Leonardo. It is capable of military transport missions, airdrops of paratroopers and materials, tactical troop support, and special forces operations. As EurasiaNet noted at the time, it marked the first official major arms sales from Western countries to Azerbaijan. A year later Leonardo reported the supply of two C-27Js to Azerbaijan. As he inspected the aircraft at the Baku airport in June 2024, Aliyev said it marks a milestone in the history of Azerbaijan-Italy relations and the beginning of military-technical cooperation between the two countries. In September 2023, the Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported that Azerbaijan seeks to purchase a wide range of Italian military equipment, including training jets, assault rifles, anti-aircraft vehicles, surface-to-air missile batteries, and midget submarines, a deal estimated to be worth between one and two billion euros. Spain Prior to 2020, the only major official defense sale, albeit non-lethal, by a NATO state was by Spain. Azerbaijan acquired Lanza-LTR radars in 2018, which were delivered the next year, according to SIPRI. In October 2019, Azerbaijan’s defense ministry reported the opening of a new “Spanish-made Radar Station that meets NATO standards,” which has been identified as a Lanza LTR-20. In February 2026, Azerbaijan unveiled what Janes, the reputed defense publication, identified as “almost certainly” a Lanza LTR-25 radar, which is the newer and upgraded version. It was shown in a video celebrating the anniversary of the country’s air force. Janes has identified at least three Lanza radars in Azerbaijan. In September 2024, a 30 mm cannon developed jointly by Azerbaijan and Spain was seen at a defense expo in Baku. It is unclear whether it has entered production or is simply a prototype. United States Prior to Vice President Vance’s recent visit to the region, President Trump said in a social media post that the United States is set to sell “Made in the U.S.A. Defense Equipment, such as body armor and boats, and more, to Azerbaijan.” In Baku, only the sale of “new boats” was announced by Vance to help Azerbaijan protect its territorial waters in the Caspian Sea. RFE/RL reported the acquisition of “four patrol boats.” Aliyev described this as “opening the chapter of cooperation in defense sales,” calling it “very promising.” Czechia and Slovakia The only Western states to have supplied major lethal armament to Azerbaijan before 2020 were Czechia and Slovakia (via Israel), but the deal was not officially sanctioned. In May 2024, Czech and Slovak media reported that Azerbaijan had placed an order for around 70 DITA self-propelled howitzers from the Czech company Excalibur Army (Czechoslovak Group). It was described as the largest artillery export contract for the Czech and Slovak defense industry since 1989. At least some of the DITA batch was reportedly delivered by September 2024. Also in May 2024, Slovakia and Azerbaijan signed a defense cooperation agreement and an MoU on military-technical cooperation. Aliyev revealed negotiations are underway on “establishing joint production facilities in the defense industry sector.” Two years later, in February 2026, the Slovak state arms company ZTS Špeciál signed a framework agreement worth 210 million euro to supply approximately 300 SAM-120 automatic mortars to Azerbaijan. An initial batch of 96 units has been agreed to, with Azerbaijan holding an option to purchase the remaining roughly 200 units later. Introduced only recently, the system has a range of around eight kilometres and is mounted on a Tatra chassis. Discussions are also underway on licensing arrangements that could allow partial or full production of the system in Azerbaijan. Russia and Belarus Despite its treaty allied status with Armenia, Russia emerged as the primary arms supplier of Baku by the mid-2010s, later to be eclipsed by Israel. Moscow’s relations with Baku regularly experience ups and downs. When Russia’s Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Baku in August 2024, he and Aliyev discussed cooperation in military-technical areas, among others. A short video posted by the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry on social media in May 2025 appeared to suggest that Russia had supplied Baku with Pantsir air defense systems. No details of this apparent deal are known. Belarus, another treaty ally of Armenia within the CSTO, covertly supplied advanced military equipment and technical services to Azerbaijan between 2018 and 2023, according to leaked documents reviewed by Politico and Armenian outlets CivilNet and Hetq (follow-up report) in mid-2024. Equipment supplied by Minsk included at least seven Groza-S counter-drone mobile warfare stations by late 2022. In May 2025, Dmitry Pantus, Chairman of Belarus’ Military-Industrial Committee, announced during a visit to Baku that the two countries would soon be co-producing defense products. He characterized military-technical cooperation between the two countries as “strategic in nature.” Conclusion Armenia, which suffered significant human and hardware losses in 2020, has since focused its efforts on modernization and stock replenishment. Azerbaijan’s procurement pattern, by contrast, points to a systematic diversification of its armed forces. The capability imbalance that existed before 2020 was sharply widened during the war and has not narrowed since. Azerbaijan’s procurement volume, diversity, long sustained by hydrocarbon revenues, remain substantially larger than Armenia’s. According to SIPRI, Azerbaijani military expenditure has exceeded Armenia’s every year since 1999. By 2011, Baku’s defense budget was five times that of Yerevan. The gap has since narrowed to roughly two-and-a-half times. Taken together, the scale, pace, and qualitative upgrading of Baku’s acquisitions suggest that even as Azerbaijan publicly endorses peace, it is simultaneously ensuring it retains the military leverage to dictate its terms. 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