Armenia’s Doctrine of Multi-Alignment: Strategic Partnerships, Not Alliances

2026-01-25 - 21:06

EVN Report is launching Statecraft & Governance, a new section by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, expanding on the analytical rigor of EVN’s Security Reports. The section will offer data-driven, evidence-based analysis on Armenia’s foreign policy, diplomatic endeavors, security and regional dynamics, as well as domestic processes, institutions and governance. Listen to the AI generated audio article. Your browser does not support the audio element. After 30 years of structural dependence and vassalization within Russia’s regional orbit, Armenia initiated a foreign and security policy reorientation that has been primarily defined through the concept of “diversification.” Initially designed to decouple from Russia through a Western pivot, the success of this pivot and its subsequent consolidation brought forth numerous questions on what exactly are the contours of Armenia’s new foreign policy and how it can be situated within the broader discourse and scholarship in international relations. Was the policy of diversification limited and performative, or were there substantive attributes to this reorientation? Was Armenia actually pivoting or temporarily hedging, and was Yerevan serious about altering the region’s alliance and security system? What, exactly, does the policy of diversification entail? More so, even if we can discern the contours of the policy of diversification, policy and doctrine are two different things, which then poses the question: what, in more concrete terms, is Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine? What are the contours of this statecraft and how well has Armenia governed this process? Lack of paradigmatic training, empirical scholarship, and advanced foreign policy analysis has contributed to an analytical environment in Armenia where speculative commentary and politicized punditry substitute for evidence-based expertise. As a result, opinion serves as fact and spurious thinking qualifies as substantive analysis, distorting the policy discourse. Why does this matter? There has been very little scholarship in qualifying the characteristics, trends, attributes, and intervening variables of Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine, but a great deal of pontification on grand conspiracy theories, preferred outcomes, and sentimental expectations. Armenia suffers from a poverty of international relations scholarship and foreign policy analysis, which has subsequently produced a public discourse that is disconnected from the actual realities of how international relations and diplomacy work. Again, why does this matter? Because it puts Armenia at an immense disadvantage in the region, particularly when neighboring states produce thinking more aligned with the latest scholarship and advanced analytical trends. It matters because before understanding and having knowledge of the content at hand, this ecosystem is speculating, demanding, or expecting outcomes that are disconnected from the substance of geopolitics and international relations. To address and mitigate this, it is Armenia’s turn to delve into statecraft, and to produce knowledge that enhances and strengthens governance in all areas of the State. Armenia’s Foreign Policy What is the difference between policy and doctrine, and if we know that Armenia’s foreign policy is defined by the policy of diversification, what is the doctrine that informs this policy? Policy entails specific rules and guidelines that govern preferred actions and outcomes of a state, while doctrine is the set of principles and fundamental beliefs that determine action and decision-making. Thus, doctrine is broader, comprehensive, and more overarching, while policy is relatively detailed, specific, and operationalizable. The policy of diversification, for example, is defined by Armenia pursuing diplomatic and security relations across various partners, without being reliant on a single external actor. Thus, it is an interest-driven policy orientation designed to replace systemic subservience. The diversification policy is not defined by an “either-or” principle, but rather, an “and-and” policy, where geostrategic posturing is defined by engaging a variety of partners to advance the national interest, as opposed to taking sides in the clash of interests between larger powers. The policy objective of diversification is to mitigate Armenia’s external security dilemma while securing tangible dividends from a diverse range of partners. Operationally, the policy of diversification can be better qualified within the framework of co-alignment, where simultaneous formation of strategic partnerships recalibrate Armenia’s access to reaping strategic dividends. The co-alignment model is operationalized through the concept of “issue-splitting.” Simply put, co-alignment is the form of statecraft which allows a small state to diversify its partners, thereby preventing larger power(s) from establishing a structure of dependency. Co-alignment, at the same time, rests on the mechanism of issue-splitting, which is the “segmentation of the relevant issue areas” for which tangible dividends are compartmentalized into “various constituent parts.” Through this approach, each issue/policy area, and segments of such areas, become the subjects of multi-tiered engagement with multiple actors from whom the small state is seeking strategic dividends. In essence, Armenia’s policy of diversification seeks to multiply the number of bilateral partners as well as bilateral (even multilateral) issues areas. Armenia’s Foreign Policy Doctrine Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine, which informs its policy of diversification, is more accurately defined by the paradigm of “multi-alignment.” The doctrinal importance here should not be overlooked: alignments and not alliances. Why? Alignment is a value-neutral concept that neither infers nor connotes any preset content on an interstate relationship, whereas the concept of alliance, by definition, has a security and some robust mechanism of an interdependency component to it. Alignment arrangements can have security dimensions, but are not primarily defined by them, while alliances, though having other dimensions, are primarily defined by security arrangements.[1] In this context, the doctrine of multi-alignment allows for the operationalization of the policy of diversification, since the principles of the doctrine revolve around a single, overarching paradigm: multi-alignment broadens the scope of mutual cooperation with global and regional powers, while bypassing ideological constraints to reduce fragmentation and geopolitical risks. Fundamentally, multi-alignment is a doctrine of de-risking hinged on plurality of partnerships, and in Armenia’s case, a plurality of strategic partnerships. Noting the scholarly consensus that in recent decades “there has been a shift away from formal alliance structures based on military force to more transient marriages of convenience on specific issues,” Armenia’s utilization of the multi-alignment doctrine precisely seeks to build a plurality of strategic partnerships based on mutual and reinforcing interests. Research demonstrates that traditional alliances are increasingly giving “way to ad hoc coalitions,” while “multilateral alliances” are giving way to bilateral arrangements. Broad findings indicate a “paradigm shift” away from military alliances to more flexible and less binding bilateral arrangements: “alignment is a supple and creative mode of statecraft; alliances, by contrast, can become rigid – and limiting as a result.” The categorical failure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), for example, and Armenia’s reliance on an outdated multilateral defense alliance, is a prolific case in point. Meaning, freezing membership and eventually leaving the CSTO, or even exiting the 1997 bilateral treaty with Russia, should not be politicized and qualified as purely an anti-Russian move, but rather, gauged within the context of scholarship and the international political system, a strategic and rational move that allows Armenia to build plurality of aligned partners, as opposed to reliance on a single, unreliable ally. Similarly, signing strategic partnerships with the United States, numerous European states, while also signing one with China, does not constitute a contradiction in foreign policy, but rather, a methodical implementation of the multi-alignment doctrine. While indeed, the level and scope of each strategic partnership and each alignment differs, it is this difference that defines the contours of statecraft and the efficacy of the diversification policy. Thus, doctrinally speaking, it is most consistent for a small state like Armenia to form a plurality of bilateral arrangements with a high number of countries, but at the same time establish a distinct hierarchy of priorities and levels of importance to each alignment arrangement. Which brings us to taxonomy and priority: not all bilateral alignments are the same (France has priority over other European partners), not every bilateral arrangement has the same importance (issue relevance, resource, and capacity determine priority), and not every strategic partnership is equal (the strategic partnership with the U.S. is prioritized over all others). Thus, in the confluence of a diversified matrix of bilateral arrangements and strategic partnerships, Armenia’s multi-alignment doctrine is operationalized through a hierarchy of priority partners. The extant literature on the subject notes four types of arrangement structures. The first, as noted above, is the concept of alliances, most prominent of which, for example, is NATO. The second is the concept of a coalition, which is a grouping of like-minded states that agree on joint action on a specific problem with no commitment to a durable relationship. Thus, unlike alliances, coalitions are ad hoc, short term, and established for a specific objective, examples include the U.S.-led Gulf Wars and War on Terror. The third are broad “communities” or supranational systems, such as the European Union or ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian States), which are regional groupings, with institutional structures and a charter/treaty, designed to promote economic and security cooperation. The fourth type are strategic partnerships, which is generally defined as structured collaboration between states to take joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to respond to security challenges that are in the mutual interests of both actors. In the taxonomy of alignment types, Armenia prefers strategic partnerships as the main mechanism of multi-alignment, with broad “communities” or supranational systems as its second preferred form of alignment. What are the attributes of the strategic partnership structure, and why has Armenia chosen this alignment model as the primary instrument (though not the only one) of its diversification policy? The strategic partnership model exhibits four distinct properties. First, it is organized around a mutually-accepted set of principles, rather than a specific task, and in this context, they are interest-defined and not always based on shared values. Second, strategic partnerships are objective-driven rather than “threat-driven” arrangements. Third, strategic partnerships entail relatively low commitment costs when compared to alliances, allowing partners a great degree of autonomy and flexibility. And fourth, economic relations is the key driver of the partnership, underwriting all other aspects of the partnership. Considering the scope and breadth of Armenia’s security environment, as well as unresolved matters still lingering even after the Washington Accords, while not ignoring future areas of complexity that are likely to arise in relation to Russia and regional geopolitics, Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine must offer efficacy, yet flexibility. Multi-alignment, as a doctrine, provides the fundamental principles of making this happen, while the policy of diversification implements and achieves goals and policy outcomes. Noting the region’s dynamic geopolitical landscape, Armenia is able to achieve important security and economic objectives through strategic partnerships, while giving itself flexibility in limiting its scope of commitments (that it would otherwise have to if it was part of a new alliance). This remains crucial in Armenia’s capacity to de-risk, manage relations with powerful neighbors, while still exercising autonomy and strategic initiative. Further, strategic partnerships address a major problem that Armenia had when it was under Russian suzerainty: access. Strategic partnerships offer developing small democracies like Armenia immense access to tangible dividends, as access to aligned partners, most of which are developed countries, makes multiplicity of access an important resource for political, economic, and technological development. Conclusion In an international system that remains in flux, amid superpower competition that is still dominated by U.S. hegemony, within a globalized world economy defined by supply chains and market access, and in a region that remains fragmented, Armenia cannot be stuck in the past failures of multi-vectorism or the shortcomings of complementarity that defined its foreign policy doctrine and foreign policy of the last two decades. Armenia cannot exist in regional isolation, as an appendage or an extension of a former hegemon, yet expect security or economic prosperity. What it observed for the last two decades was the opposite: insecurity and underdevelopment. Under multi-alignment, through its Western pivot, and hinged on the success of its diversification policy, Armenia has proceeded to expand the scope and depth of its relationships with a large number of partners. From marginalization and vassalage, Armenia has stepped out and become an important regional actor, a reliable and functional partner, and perhaps one of the few small democracies with a potential not seen in others in the Eurasian space. The policy of diversification was not produced in a vacuum. It is not some uninformed, ad hoc policy that was patched together as an act of ephemeral politicking. Rather, it is a comprehensive and well-developed foreign policy hinged and predicated on a substantive doctrine. It is born of scholarship, best-practices, empirical insights, and actionable outcomes. For the first time since independence, Armenia has a foreign policy doctrine birthed from the art of statecraft. Footnotes: [1] The accepted definition of an alliance in the disciple is as follows: “alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.” Dr. Nerses Kopalyan is an Associate Professor-in-Residence of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His fields of specialization include international security, geopolitics, political theory, and philosophy of science. He has conducted extensive research on polarity, superpower relations, and security studies. He is the author of “World Political Systems After Polarity” (Routledge, 2017), the co-author of “Sex, Power, and Politics” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and co-author of “Latinos in Nevada: A Political, Social, Economic Profile” (2021, Nevada University Press), and the upcoming “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the 2020 War” (Routledge 2026). His current research and academic publication concentrate on geopolitical and great power relations within Eurasia, with specific emphasis on democratic breakthroughs within authoritarian orbits. He has conducted extensive field work in Armenia on the country’s security architecture and its democratization process. He has authored several policy papers for the Government of Armenia and served as voluntary advisor to various state institutions. Dr. Kopalyan is also a regular contributor to EVN Report. Comment